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Abstract: 
The evolution of labor force participation rate is modeled using a lagged linear function of real economic 
growth, as expressed by GDP per capita. For the U.S., our model predicts at a two-year horizon with RMSFE of 
0.28% for the period between 1965 and 2007. Larger part of the deviation between predicted and measured LFP 
is  explained  by  artificial  dislocations  in  measured  time  series  induced  by  major  revisions  to  the  CPS 
methodology in 1979 and 1989. Similar models have been developed for Japan, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, 
and Sweden. 
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1. Introduction 
The number of people  having  some  paid  job or its equivalent and  those  who  are  currently 
unemployed but seek for a job is called the labor force. The ratio of the labor force and overall 
working age population defines macroeconomic term “participation rate”, which provides a measure 
of  labor  supply  not  dependent  on  population  size.  Both  working  age  population  and  labor  force 
participation rate (LFP) vary over time and across countries. Obviously, the level of population of 16 
years of age and older is driven by a multitude of factors including social, economic, geographic, and 
ethnic ones. Conventional economic theories also consider various forces driving the rate of labor 
force participation [Aaronson et al., (2006); Aaronson, Park, and Sullivan, (2006, 2007); Hausman, 
(1986); Haveman et al., (1991), Hotchkiss, (2004, 2005); Juhn and Potter, (2006); Murphy and Topel, 
(1987);  Veracierto,  (2008);  Wachter,  (1978);  among  many  others].  These  theories  imply  that  the 
evolution and effects of these forces are difficult to forecast [Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 
(2004)]. Results of our research support an opposite view and demonstrate that there exists a unique 
factor  completely  controlling  the  evolution  of  participation  rate  in  developed  countries  –  real 
economic growth as defined by GDP per capita. 
Because of the benefits provided by continuous, extensive, and open statistic information we 
first analyze and model the rate of labor force participation in the U.S.  
Figure 1 displays the growth rate of the LFP obtained from its original time series [Bureau of 
Labor Statistics [BLS], (2008)] and a centered five-year moving average, MA(5). The rate rose during 
the 1960s through 1980s. Since 2000 it has been decreasing. Previous investigations, Aaronson et al. 
(2006) and Fullerton (2003) among others, demonstrated that, historically, the change of trend (for 
example, from the current negative one to a positive one) has not been accurately predicted. 
Several  models  have  been  developed  for  the  prediction  of  LFP  at  various  time  horizons. 
Aaronson et al. (2006) proposed a model with cyclical and structural components of the participation 
rate  evolution  affected  by  demographic  factors,  the  business  cycle,  and  other  factors.  Fallick  and 
Pingle (2007) proposed a model of labor force participation based on cohorts. In their framework, the 
probability of individual participation declines with age beyond 50. However, Kitov (2005c) showed 
that there exists an effect of the increasing age of the peak mean income, which counteracts the effect 
of lowering participation with age. In any case, one can expect significant changes in the LFP due to 
the ageing of labor supply. Fallick and Pingle also considered the effects of participation trends on the 

























Figure 1. The growth rate of labor force participation (LFP) in the U.S. between 1960 and 2007 as 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The original time series is smoothed by a centered 5-year moving 
average, MA(5). Notice the increase in the growth rate of the LFP since 2003. 
 
The knowledge of the evolution of labor force participation is crucial for the development of 
appropriate budgetary, tax, macroeconomic, and financial policy. This is the task for such institutions 
as the Congressional Budget Office (2004, 2006), the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS) (Su, 2007; 
Toossi, 2005, 2007; Figueroa and Woods, 2007), and the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB San Francisco, 
2007; Himmelberg and McConnell, 2005). For example, the CBO (2006)  
 
… developed a microsimulation approach for analyzing Social Security and other long-term 
policy issues in order to provide the Congress with comprehensive analyses of the budgetary, 
distributional, and aggregate economic aspects of various policy choices. The microsimulation 
approach makes it possible to examine how policy affects individuals’ benefits under current 
law and proposed alternatives, including individual accounts. 
 
These  models  and  corresponding  LFP  projections  are  characterized  by  different  forecasting 
accuracy at various time horizons [CBO, (2004)]. Also, the U.S. Census Bureau (CB) revises the 
Current  Population  Survey  (CPS)  methodology  and  procedures  with  possible  inconsistencies  and 
incompatibility  of  data  over  time  [CB,  (2002,  2005)].  In  1979,  the  Census  Bureau  applied  new 
population controls obtained in the 1980 census and implemented a new questionnaire. In 1994, the 
CB  introduced  computer-assisted  interviewing  techniques  with  new  definitions  of  the  labor  force 
concepts [Polivka, (1996); Polivka and Miller, (1998); Polivka and Rothgeb, (1993)]. The redesigned 
CPS reports more individuals as being in labor force than did the old survey. This effect is an age-, 
race-, and gender-dependent, however, and produces artificial steps of different height in the time 
series for various population groups. Such steps result in even higher spikes in the time derivatives of 
these time series. 
Bearing in mind existing economic models for the LFP evolution, numerous factors apparently 
influencing LFP, and data availability and quality for the U.S. and some other developed countries we 
have developed a model, which links aggregate  LFP to single economic variable – real GDP per 
capita. This link is fundamental and expresses the inherent trade-off between economic growth and 
personal income distribution. Our model is quantitatively formulated and tested on the sample of the 
U.S. and then validated by modeling LFP in other developed countries. Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  1  presents  some  working 
assumptions on quantitative links between labor force participation rate, personal income distribution, 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita, and the number of 9-year-olds. In Section 2, we test these 
assumptions and quantitative relationships against actual data and present some predictions of the 
future evolution of labor force participation rate in the U.S.  Section 3 presents results of similar 
analysis  for  some  other  developed  counties,  which  tests  and  validates  the  trade-off  between  real 
economic growth and labor force participation rate. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
Our  principal  assumption  consists  in  the  existence  of  an  inherent  trade-off  between  the 
mechanisms of personal income distribution (PID) and economic growth. In the U.S., personal income 
distribution  has  not  been  changing  much  since  the  start  of  corresponding  measurements  in  1947 
[Kitov, (2007)]. So, the changes in the rate of economic growth have been accommodated by some 
changes in relative performance of these mechanisms of income redistribution, not by changes in the 
distribution itself. Obviously, the rate of participation in labor force, as one of such mechanisms of 
income redistribution, has been changing over time. Therefore, it is reasonable to start with some 
features of the PID in the U.S.  
The distribution of personal incomes in the U.S. has two branches – quasi-exponential one for 
incomes  from  zero  to  some  level,  which  is  called  the  Pareto  threshold.  From  this  threshold,  the 
personal incomes are distributed according to a power law or the Pareto law. Kitov (2005ab) showed 
that each and every personal income, except the highest ~10% characterized by the Pareto distribution, 
grows  with an  approximately  constant  annual  increment to some  critical  work  experience  [Kitov, 
(2005c)]. This quasi-constant increment leads to an exponential growth (of average income for given 
age) with a negative index: {1-exp(-at)}, where a is a small index, t is the working experience. This is 
a type of satiation process for personal income with age. The process of the average income growth 
stops when the working experience reaches some critical value, Tcr. This critical working experience 
evolves with time as the square root of real GDP per capita, as shown by Kitov (2005c). Then, an 
exponential decay of the average income with work experience is observed. For our purposes, the 
most important empirical fact is that personal income distribution in the U.S. has been practically not 
changing,  when  normalized  to  contemporary  working  age  population  and  total  personal  income 
[Kitov, (2007)]. Effectively, fractions of total personal income have been distributed in the same way 
among the same fractions of the working age population. As a result, the Gini coefficient for the 
personal incomes reported by the CB has not been changing over time. 
Let’s  assume  that  all  persons  who  have  a  paid  job  or  its  equivalent  do  participate  in  the 
production of real GDP. Similarly to the personal income distribution, personal inputs to the real GDP 
should also be distributed over working population according to some functional dependence on the 
input. It would be not too inaccurate to assume that these personal inputs to the GDP are exponentially 
distributed, i.e. the number of people with given input increases exponentially with a decreasing level 
of the input. 
What are qualitative and quantitative effects of real economic growth on LFP considering the 
fixed (normalized) PID and relevant inputs to the GDP in the U.S.? As shown by Kitov (2006cd), 
increasing labor supply has no effect on the growth rate of real GDP per capita since the latter depends 
only on the attained level of real GDP per capita, G, and on the changing number of 9-year-olds, N9, 
according to the following relationship: 
 
dG/G = 0.5dN9/N9 + A1/G                 (1) 
or, in the reversed form,  
dN9/N9 = 2(dG/G – A1/G)                 (1´) 
 
where A1 is an empirical constant. The term A1/G can be associated with potential economic 
growth. In other words, real economic  growth in the U.S. would be inversely proportional to the 
attained level of real GDP per capita if the N9 has not been changing.  Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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Figure 2 compares the number of 9-year-olds measured by the Census Bureau and that predicted 
by (1´), where the estimates of real GDP per capita are borrowed from the Conference Board database 
(2008). (For the U.S. and other developed countries in this study, GDP per capita in 1990 U.S. dollars 
is  used,  i.e.  that  converted  at  Geary  Khamis  PPPs.)  Our  model  explains  80%  (R
2  =0.8)  of  the 
variability in real GDP per capita between 1960 and 2006. This is an excellent result considering the 
accuracy of measurement of both G and N9. (Notice that the prediction of real economic growth at a 





























Figure 2. Observed and predicted number of 9-year-olds in the U.S. The predicted number is obtained 
from the estimates of real GDP per capita according to (1) with A1=$398 (1990 U.S. dollars). Notice that this 
relationship demonstrates a non-linear link between the number of 9-year-olds and the growth rate of real GDP 
per capita. It is presumed in this study that the latter variable is the driving force of the growth in labor force 
participation rate. Linear regression is also depicted in the lower panel and provides an estimate of the goodness-
of-fit: R
2 = 0.8. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  growth  in  real  GDP  can  influence  labor  force  supply  through 
redistribution of personal incomes. Fluctuations in the number of 9-year-olds produce fluctuations in 
real GDP per capita relative to that defined by potential economic growth, A1/G, and thus provide Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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variations in personal income relative to some neutral growth rate. The simplest assumption on the 
redistribution of some excessive (positive) amount of personal income consists in the increase of the 
fraction of population in labor force. At first glance, more people would be able to obtain paid jobs 
with extra money in the economy. Surprisingly, this assumption is wrong for the U.S. The intuition 
behind the mechanism of LFP reaction on the redistribution of the money excess is opposite – less 
people are forced to seek income through paid job because of other channels (not included in the CPS 
questionnaire)  of  personal  income  redistribution.  A  smaller  part  of  the  working  age  population 
receives more income and somehow transfers it to the fraction of the populations not in labor force to 
recover original PID. When the growth rate of real GDP per capita is below its potential the total 
personal income grows at a rate below the neutral one and the lack of personal income earned by given 
labor force has to be compensated by an increase in the LFP. Figure 2 demonstrates that the N9 was on 
a downward trend in the late 1960s and the1970s. Hence, these years are characterized by the growth 
rate of real GDP per capita below its potential and, thus, by an increasing labor force participation. On 
the contrary, the years after 1983 have to demonstrate a decreasing rate of the growth in the labor 
force participation. All these effects can be observed in Figure 1. 
The influence of the growth in real GDP on the LFP has to be complicated by the presence of 
the exponential distribution of personal inputs to real GDP – the number of people with given income 
roll-off exponentially as a function of income. If the effect of real growth is based on the excess of the 
total personal income above its potential level, then higher levels of the LFP are more sensitive to real 
growth. Really, more people can be included in or excluded from the redistribution because of their 
smaller personal incomes for paid jobs, which are replaced by some other (not measured) mechanisms 
of personal income earning. It is reasonable to assume that the sensitivity of the LFP to the difference 
between actual and potential growth rates, g(t)=dG/G–A1/G, increases exponentially with increasing 
LFP. Also, there might be a time delay between action and reaction and the LFP may lag behind the 
g(t). Now we are ready for a quantitative analysis with a tentative relationship: 
 
{B1dLFP(t)/LFP(t) + C1}exp{ α1[LFP(t) – LFP(t0)]/LFP(t0) = 
= ∫{dG(t-T))/G(t-T) – A1/G(t-T)}dt              (2) 
 
where B1 and C1 are empirical (country-specific) calibration constants, α1 is empirical (also country-
specific) exponent, t0 is the start year of modeling, T is the time lag, and dt=t2-t1, t1 and t2  are the start 
and the  end  time of the time  period for the integration of the  g(t) (one year in our  model). The 
exponential term defines the change in the sensitivity due to deviation of the LFP from its initial value 
LFP(t0). Effectively, the LFP(t) is a nonlinear function of real economic growth and the trajectory of 
the g(t) in the past does matter for the attained level of labor force participation. 
A simple transformation of (2) using (1ۢ) provides another useful form of relationship (2), which 
relies on the N9(t) instead of the integral of the g(t): 
 
{B2dLFP(t)/LFP(t) + C2} exp{α2[LFP(t) – LFP(t0)]/LFP(t0)} = N9(t-T)     (3) 
 
where B2 and C2 are empirical constant different from B1, C1, and α2=α1. 
  Historically,  we first  tried to  model dLFP/LFP as a nonlinear function of G and  tested  a 
simple relationship similar to (1ۢ): 
 
dLFP(t)/LFP(t) =  D1[dG(t-T)/G(t-T) – A2/G(t-T)] +D2          (4) 
 
where D1 and D2 are empirical (country specific) constants, and A2 is also an empirical constant, which 
is different from A1 in (1). This model served as a workhorse for those countries, which do not provide 
accurate estimates of the specific age population. Relationship (4) mimics the nonlinear relationship 
reciprocal to (2). According to (2) one can rewrite (4) in the following (discrete) form: 
 




dLFP(t2)/LFP(t2) = N(t2-T)/B + C              (6) 
 
where N(t) is the (formally defined) specific age population, as obtained using A2 instead of A1, 
B  and  C  are  empirical  constants.  Relationship  (5)  defines  the  evolution  of  some  specific  age 
population,  which  is  different  from  actual  one.  The  discrete  form  is  useful  for  calculations.  The 
difference between (3) and (6) consists in the absence of nonlinear terms in (6). It is worth noting that 
relationships  (4)  through  (6)  represent  a  formal  model  and  do  not  pretend  to  fully  substitute  the 
meaning of the specific age population, labor force, and real economic growth implied in (2) and (3). 
 
3. Modeling the evolution of labor force participation in the U.S. 
As in any empirical analysis, we first discuss availability and quality of relevant data. We use 
the original source reporting the estimates of labor force participation rate in the U.S. – the BLS 
(2008). As clear from Figure 1, the original growth rate is characterized by a high volatility induced by 
relatively low accuracy of corresponding measurements. Therefore, we use MA(5) in our comparisons 
of observed and predicted time series. One also has to bear in mind that the difference between the 
LFP measured according to the Census Bureau’s definition and some true LFP, which represents the 
variable for a valid quantitative analysis. Due to numerous revisions to the CB’s definition over time 
this difference is also time dependent and introduces significant noise in the analysis.  
Estimates of real GDP per capita can be obtained from many sources. We have chosen the 
Conference Board database (2008) because it provides PPP estimates for other developed countries 
what  might  bring  some  consistency  in  the  overall  cross  country  comparison.    Direct  statistical 
assessment of the uncertainty in the growth rate of the overall real GDP estimates is not available 
[Fixler and Grimm, (2005)], but numerous revisions to corresponding annual estimates indicate that 
one percentage point is a reasonable value for the uncertainty.  
Considering  about  the  same  uncertainty  in  the  estimates  of  working  age  population  (CBO, 
2004) one can conclude that the accuracy of the estimates of the growth arte of real GDP per capita is 
not better than 1 percentage point as well. Hence, relative differences of 1 to 2 percentage points 
between measured and predicted values in this study are inside the uncertainty of original estimates 
and do not need any  additional explanation. The above mentioned revisions to population related 
variables introduce extra uncertainty, however.  
Relationship (3) is the start point of our modeling. Visual fit between predicted and measured 
dLFP/LFP has been sought. Figure 3 presents results of the N9(t) prediction, which can be replaced 
with G by (2), using the original LFP time series from the BLS.  
Corresponding  constants  are  as  follows:  t0=1963;  T=2  years,  ￿￿=-1.85,  B2=-1.5E+8, 
C2=4.94E+6. The predicted time series leads the observed one by two years, i.e. an accurate forecast at 
a two-year horizon is a natural feature of the model. Coefficient B2 is negative what results in a 
declining rate of the LFP growth during the years of real growth above the potential one, for example, 
between 1983 and 2000. Exponential term in (3) provides a factor of 0.77 in 2000 (the largest LFP of 
67.1%) relative to 1963, when the LFP was only 58.7%. This means that 1% change in N9 at the LFP 
level of 67.1% produces a larger change in the dLFP/LFP by factor of 1/0.77=1.3 than 1% change at 
the level of 58.7%. Effectively, the sensitivity of the LFP to the N9 is 1.3 times larger. Also displayed 
is  the  case  without  exponential  weighting,  ￿￿=0.  This  case  demonstrates  that  the  specific  age 
population (N9) is overestimated by the model. 
Considering  the  uncertainty  in  the  underlying  time  series  –  N9  and  LFP,  the  observed  and 
predicted time series are in a good overall agreement: timing of main turns in both series is excellent 
and amplitudes of the largest changes are also practically coincide.  
The  measured  number  of  9-year-olds  is  characterized  by  a  high  uncertainty  related  to  two 
sources – methodology and procedures of measurements in decennial censuses and interpolation of the 
census  estimated  between  the  years  of  censuses  using  birth-death-immigration  components  of  the 
population projection. West and Robinson (1999) estimated the uncertainty in the number of 9-year-
olds for the 1990 census between 3% and 5% in the age group between 5 and 9 years. Especially high Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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revisions to the population estimates are made near census years – as seen from Figure 3. The largest 
deviations between the predicted and observed population are around the censuses. 
So, Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that real economic growth (or N9, which is an equivalent to G) 
may explain the evolution of labor force participation rate in the U.S. after 1963. There is another way 
to invert equations (2) and (3), as represented by relationships (5) and (6). These relationships allow 
expressing LFP as a nonlinear function of G what facilitates the prediction of labor supply. At the 
same  time,  relationships  (5)  and  (6)  are  just  a  useful  approximation  in  the  case  when  necessary 














N9 from LFP, not weighted
 
 
Figure 3. The number of 9-year-olds: the observed one and that obtained from the LFP with and without 
exponential weighting in (3). Constants t0=1963; B2=-1.5E+8, C2=4.94E+6, α2=-1.85. Also shown is the case 
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Figure 4. Observed and predicted growth rate of LFP in the U.S. The latter is obtained from real GDP per 
capita using (5) and (6) with N(1959)=4.5E+6, A2=$350 (1990-dollars), B=-1.23E+8, C=0.04225.  



























Figure 5. Evolution of the transient part, g(t), of the growth rate of real GDP per capita, G: 
g(t) = dG(t)/G(t) – A2/G(t), where A2= $350 (1990-dollars) is empirical (and country-specific) constant.  
Also shown is the cumulative value of the transient part. Notice the growth of the cumulative value since 
1983.  
 
Figure  4  depicts  the  observed  and  predicted  relative  change  rate  of  the  LFP.  The  latter  is 
obtained from (5) and (6) with the following constants and coefficients: N(1959)=4.5E+6, A2=$350, 
B=-1.23E+8,  C=0.04225.  Notice  that  coefficient  A2  is  smaller  than  A1=$398  in  (1).  Due  to  high 
volatility of the original dLFP/LFP time series we compare the predicted time series to MA(5) of the 
observed  series  –  corresponding  linear  regression  is  shown  in  the  lower  panel  of  Figure  4.  The 
goodness-of-fit is high: R
2=0.73. More important is that timing of main turns in the observed time 
series is well predicted at a two-year horizon – the predicted series is still two years ahead of the Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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observed one: T=2 years. Figure 5 displays the evolution of the g(t) and its cumulative value.  Since A2 
< A1, the cumulative value of g(t) has a strong positive trend after 1983. Reciprocally, the dLFP/LFP 
is characterized by a negative trend. 
Having the prediction of the dLFP/LFP from the G, one can predict the LFP itself. Figure 6 
compares the original labor force participation rate and that obtained from the predicted time series 
presented in Figure 4. Both curves are synchronized due to a two-year back-shift of the predicted 
curve. There are three major deviations between the curves – all are associated with large revisions to 
the original LFP. The root-mean-square forecasting error (RMSFE) of the LFP at a two year horizon 
for the period between 1968 and 2006 is 0.28%. This accuracy is slightly larger than that inherent to 
the original time series (from 0.1% to 0.2%) and, noticeably, obtained using raw data. The elimination 














Figure 6. Observed and predicted LFP in the U.S. The latter is obtained from the growth rate time series 
presented in Figure 5. Notice the largest deviation between the curves is associated with the years of major 
revisions to the LFP – 1980 and 1990.  
 
Relationship (1) provides a unique opportunity to foresee the evolution of the LFP 11 years 
ahead.  Really,  the  number  of  9-year-olds  can  be  predicted  from  the  younger  birth  cohorts  and 
additional two years are given by the lag of the LFP behind real economic growth.  
Figure 7 shows qualitatively what will be the direction of the LFP evolution. It displays the 
projections of N9 and dN9/N9 using 6- and 1-year-olds, as available by the end of 2007. The years 2007 
through 2010 are the turning ones for real economic growth – the negative trend observed between 
2000 and 2009 should be switched to a positive one. But even poor years for the U.S. economy 
between  2001  and  2010  are  characterized  by  a  negative  trend  in  the  dLFP/LFP,  as  Figure  4 
demonstrates. This effect is related to the difference between A1 and A2 (A1 > A2) – even real economic 
growth at a rate slightly below its potential value A1/G is still above the A2/G, which is the watershed 
for the growth rate of the LFP. Really nasty years, i.e. those with very low or even negative dG/G, are 













































Figure 7. Prediction of the number of 9-year-olds by extrapolation of population estimates for younger 
ages (1- and 6-year-olds). A) Total population estimates. The time series for younger cohorts are shifted ahead 
by 8 and 3 years, respectively. B) The change rate of the population estimates given in a), which is proportional 
to the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Notice the difference in the change rate provided by 1-year-olds and 6-
year-olds for the period between 2003 and 2010. This discrepancy is related to the age-dependent difference in 
population revisions.  



















Figure 8. Prediction of the LFP evolution in the USA between 2000 and 2014 from the number of 3-year-
olds. Flat segment between 2004 and 2009 will end up in a rapid drop by 1.3% after 2010. This is the effect of an 
elevated (above potential) real economic growth.  
 
The acceleration of real economic growth, which will be observed after 2010, will also bring 
additional  acceleration  to  the  process  of  the  declining  labor  force  participation  rate,  as  Figure  8 
demonstrates. The effect of the declining LFP will be mapped into a slowdown in the growth in labor 
force itself. As a consequence, inflation will drop close or below zero [Kitov, (2006ef); Kitov, Kitov, 
Dolinskaya, (2007a)]. All in all, the Golden Era will come back – real economic growth above its 
potential,  low  inflation,  and  low  participation  rate  –  the  middle  class  has  enough  money  to  run 
families. What could be better? 
 
4. Modeling the evolution of LFP in developed countries 
There are two general methods to validate empirical relationships – to extend data set for one 
system  or  to  describe  with  the  same  model  the  evolution  of  similar  systems  over  the  same  time 
interval. In Section 2, we demonstrated the accuracy of our empirical model linking LFP and real 
economic growth in the U.S. for the period between 1963 and 2006. In this Section, we extend our 
approach  and  model  LFP  to  some  other  developed  countries.  One  can  consider  this  study  as  a 
validation of the model for the U.S. Therefore, we just present quantitative results not discussing them 
in details.  
We begin with the closest neighbor of the U.S. – Canada. The upper panel in Figure 9 depicts 
the  observed  and  predicted  rate  of  LFP  change.  The  predicted  time  series  is  obtained  using  the 
following coefficients in (5) and (6): N(1959)=270000, A2=$342, B=4.0E+6, C=-0.0607. We did not 
use linear regression to obtain these coefficients. In order to obtain the best fit, only visual similarity 
between  cumulative  values  was  sought.  In  many  aspects,  the  approach  based  on  cumulative 
representation provides a useful constraint on the coefficients in relationships (5) and (6) due to high 
sensitivity  of  cumulative  values  to  small  disturbances  and  deviations  (Kitov,  Kitov,  Dolinskaya, 
2007ab). This constraint is similar to mass and energy conservation law in physics. Regression usually 
underestimates coefficients in linear relationships. The lower panel in Figure 9 presents the measured 
LFP and that obtained from the predicted dLFP/LFP in the upper panel. One can observe an excellent 
agreement in timing and amplitudes of the changes in both LFPs – mainly these curves coincide. This 
agreement supports our assumption that real economic growth completely defines the evolution of 
LFP  in  developed  countries.  The  difference  between  the  cumulative  curves  is  likely  defined  by 
measurement noise. Therefore, no other factors are needed for the description of the observed LFP. 































Figure 9. Upper panel: observed [MA(5)] and predicted growth rate of LFP in Canada: N(1959)=270000, 
A2=$342 (1990 U.S. dollars), B=4.0E+6, C=-0.0607, T=0 years. For the period between 1963 and 2006, a linear 
regression gives the goodness-of-fit, R
2=0.78.  
The lower panel depicts the observed and predicted LFP. 
 
Canada provides one of the best examples of successful modeling for the entire period between 
1960 and 2006 and s also characterized by a wide dLFP/LFP dynamic range: from -1.0E-2 [y 
-1] to 
+2.0E-2 [y 
-1], with the LFP changing from 55.9% in 1963 to 67.4% in 2006. Dynamic range is a 
crucial characteristic for any empirical study because it defines resolution. The wider is the dynamic 
range the higher is the resolution, for the same signal to noise ratio. The noise is defined by the 
uncertainty  in  corresponding  measurements.  As  mentioned  above,  cumulative  (or  integral)  values 
significantly improve the resolution due to larger incoming signals. 
The modeling of the evolution of labor force participation in Italy has also been successful. The 
upper panel in Figure 10 displays the measured and predicted dLFP/LFP. The later is obtained using 
the  following  coefficients:  N(1959)=570000,  A2=$270;  B=1.3E+7,  C=-0.0667,  T=0.  (Notice  a Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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relatively low value of A2.) Linear regression of the time series in the upper panel (between 1963 and 






























Figure 10. Observed [MA(5)] and predicted growth rate of LFP in Italy: N(1959)=570000, A2=$270 
(1990 U.S. dollars), B=1.3E+7, C=-0.0667, T=0. For the period between 1963 and 2006, a linear regression 
gives the goodness-of-fit, R
2=0.71.  
The lower panel depicts the original LFP, changing in the range from 56.1% in 1960 to 47.2% in 1984, 
and the predicted LFP. 
 
The lower panel in Figure 10 shows that the dynamic range of LFP for Italy is also wide – from 
56.1% in 1960 to 47.2% in 1984. The predicted cumulative curve is very close to the measured one 
over the entire period between 1960 and 2006. This is a clear indication that real economic growth 
completely defines the evolution of labor force participation in Italy. Small deviations are potentially 
induced by measurement noise and revisions to labor force definitions.  
France  is  an  opposite  example  of  a  country  with  a  narrow  range  of  LFP  change  and, 
correspondingly, low growth rate, dLFP/LFP. The upper panel in Figure 11 indicates that absolute Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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value of the change rate is generally below 0.003 [y 
-1] between 1963 and 2000. The LFP, as the lower 
panel in Figure 11 shows, dropped quickly between 1960 and 1963 – from 59.5% to 57%. This period 
is described relatively well with our model. The period between 1997 and 2005, is characterized by an 
increase in the LFP from 55.6% to 57%. We failed to simulate this period with our model, but the 
deviation between the observed and predicted rates are relatively small: ~0.005 [y 
-1]. The cumulative 
curve related to the predicted dLFP/LFP also deviates from the observed LFP. Due to the narrow 
dynamic range, it is difficult to associate this deviation with one principal source. This deviation does 

































Figure 11. Observed and predicted growth rate of LFP in France: N(1959)=570000, A=$290 (1990 U.S. 
dollars), B=2.0E+7, C=-0.0425, T=0. For the case with N18: B=2.4E+7, C=-0.035.  
The lower panel depicts the original LFP, changing in the range from 59.5% in 1960 to 55.5 % in 1995, 










































Figure 12. Observed and predicted growth rate of LFP in Japan: N(1959)=1570000, A=$390 (1990 U.S. 
dollars), B=6.5E+7, C=-0.048, T=0. For the case with N18: B=3.5E+7, C=-0.052. 
The lower panel depicts the original LFP, changing in the range from 68% in 1960 to 61% % in 2005, and 
the predicted LFP. The latter consists of two separated segments. We failed to predict LFP between 1972 and 
1978. 

































Figure 13. Observed and predicted growth rate of LFP in the UK: N(1959)=570000, A2=$340(1990 U.S. 
dollars), B=6.0E+7, C=-0.062, T=0.  
For the case with N9: B=1.15E+7, C=-0.064. 
The lower panel depicts the original LFP, changing in the range from 61% in 1970 to 64.5 % in 1990, and 
the predicted LFP. 
Japan and the UK, presented in Figure 12 and 13, respectively, are very similar in an accurate 
prediction of dLFP/LFP from both G and the specific age population: 18 years of age for Japan and 9-
years of age for the UK [Kitov, (2006bd)]. Coefficients for corresponding models are given in figure 
captions. These  accurate predictions, however, span a narrower period after ~1970. The predicted 
curves  describe  amplitudes  and  timing of  major  turns in the observed  curves.  This  is  a principal 
feature because conventional LFP models are based on the extrapolation of existing (mainly linear) Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 
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trends and do not foresee any turns. Our model allows prediction of the LFP evolution in Japan at 18-
year horizon! The discrepancy before 1970 are not well explained and might be linked to revisions to 
labor force and real economic growth definitions, and measurement errors. 
Labor  force participation  in  Sweden has been  also  well described  after 1975, as  Figure 14 
shows. It is similar to Japan and the UK but there are no independent estimates provided by specific 
age population. The dynamic range of the dLFP/LFP changes is also not specifically wide – from -
0.008 [y 
-1] to +0.002 [y 































Figure 14. Observed and predicted growth rate of LFP in Sweden: N(1959)=100000, A2=$310 (1990 U.S. 
dollars), B=2.2E+6, C=-0.0465, T=0.  
The lower panel depicts the original LFP, changing in the range from 67% in 1990 to 62.5 % in 1998, and 
the predicted LFP.  
 
Six  countries  were  analyzed  and  all  demonstrated  results  positive  for  the  validation  of  our 
model with real economic growth driving labor force participation. Apparently, more investigations 
are necessary including revisions to data compatibility and quality. A straightforward extension would 
be the inclusion of other developed countries. There is also a mystery associated with the fact that the Volume III_Issue3 (5)_Fall2008 
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effect of real growth on LFP in all studied countries is opposite to that in the U.S., where coefficient B 
is negative.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There  exist  a  trade-off  between  real  economic  growth  and  the  evolution  of  labor  force  in 
developed countries. Moreover, the results obtained in this study for the period between 1960 and 
2007 quantitatively support the assumption that real GDP per capita is likely to completely define 
LFP. 
One fundamental difference between the U.S. and other countries consists in the opposite signs 
of coefficient B: negative for the U.S. and positive for all other studied countries. Effectively, the U.S. 
is  the  only  country  where  an  elevated  real  economic  growth  results  in  decreasing  labor  force 
participation. Such a striking contrast in labor force behavior needs a special analysis. 
The evolution of the aggregate LFP puts a strong constrain on the evolution in various age-
gender-race groups. It is likely that the mechanism of the influence of real economic growth on LFP in 
these groups is essentially the same. Therefore, the poorest (in average) age groups with the lowermost 
LFP are less sensitive to real economic growth - youngest and eldest people are among them. 
In any case, the obtained empirical relationships are useful in predictions of LFP in developed 
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